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PARODY AND FAIR USE:
THE CRITICAL QUESTION*
Parody is an independent art form of ancient lineage, stretching back
beyond Aristophanes. I It is a form of satire which achieves its effects by
mimicking the work or style of another author, often closely paralleling
the structure or even the wording of the original. 2 Hence, parody may
collide with the copyright claims of the author of the original work. 3
When two art forms, both with their own value to society, collide in the
copyright arena, which should win?
Suits against parodists for copyright infringement are a relatively re-
cent phenomenon. 4 After a 1955 decision which held that parody was
infringement, 5 courts have tended to -espouse the view that parody de-
serves at least some special treatment, a recognition of its special value to
society. 6 Most courts, however, have taken the social contribution of par-
ody on faith and have not analyzed precisely wherein its value lies. 7
A parody which substantially copies its original infringes the copyright
* 1981 winner, first prize, Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Washing-
ton. The Burkan competition is sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers. A slightly different version of this comment has been entered in the national competition.
1. For a brief overview of the history of parody, see Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in tle
Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1133-37 (1955). Another condensed history is found in
the PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETnCs 601-02 (enlarged ed. A. Peminger 1974)
[hereinafter cited as PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA].
2. Critical parody has been defined as the exaggerated imitation of a work of art. Like caricature,
it is based on distortion, bringing into bolder relief the salient features of a writer's style or habit of
mind. It belongs to the genus satire and thus performs the double-edged task of reform and ridicule.
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note I, at 600.
3. Not all parody depends on copying which is substantial enough to raise a copyright cause of
action. See note 28 infra.
4. There was a small flurry of "parody" cases in the first two decades of this century. Three of
these actually involved impersonation of one actress by another, using a copyrighted song in the
process. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Mitzenheimer, 177 F. 286
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903). Only one
involved a real attempt at parody of a work. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914) (play based on "Mutt and Jeff" comic strip).
5. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd
sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356
U.S. 43 (1958).
6. E.g., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'dpercuriam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132
(1980); 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
7. The court in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350
(S.D. Cal. 1955), briefly considered parody's historical role. The Second Circuit in Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), and Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n. I (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1980), noted, without analysis, parody's role as criticism and humor.
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in that original8 absent some affirmative defense. Thus courts have used
the broad notion of "fair use," which allows some unlicensed borrowing
of otherwise copyright-protected material, 9 to give parodists some free-
dom to copy. The problem has been in deciding how much freedom to
allow. The courts' solution has been to recognize that parody depends on
mimicry. Thus they have allowed parodists to take only as much as is
necessary to make the audience aware that the original is being mim-
icked. This is the "conjure up" doctrine, the main test used in deciding
parody cases today. 10
The mere need to mimic, however, is not a sound rationale for allowing
fair use. II A test for parody cases which merely recognizes that parody
must copy to achieve its purposes says nothing about what those purposes
in fact are. Yet parody should be accorded the special status of fair use
only if its purposes are so important to society that incursion on the origi-
nal author's rights is justified. 12 Thus, a test for parody should focus on
whether its taking is necessary to accomplish its purpose. This requires
defining the purpose, something the courts have not done with sufficient
sophistication. Some courts have noted the humor of parody as its
value. 13 True, parody usually is funny. But not all funny adaptations of a
work are parody. "My Fair Lady" is not a parody either of Shaw's Pyg-
malion or of the underlying myth; it is a musical comedy version of both.
The real value of parody to society lies not in its humor but in its criti-
cism, for "at its best, [parody] is a critical instrument of telling force
because it approaches the subject from within rather than from with-
out . . 4 This critical effect is what distinguishes parody from a
comic adaptation. As criticism, parody fulfills an important social func-
8. Infringement is not well defined in the Copyrights Act. See Copyrights Act § 101. 17 U.S.C.
app. § 501 (1976). The elements of a cause of action have been developed by the courts. Briefly, to
prove a prima facie case of infringement, plaintiff must show that defendant copied her work by
showing that defendant had access to her work and that his work is "substantially similar." See note
27 infra. For a more complete discussion of proof of infringement, see 3 M. NINMIER. NINttER ON
COPYRIGHT §§ 13.01-.03 (1979). The penalties for infringement may be civil, 17 U.S.C. app. §§
502-505 (1976), or criminal, 17 U.S.C. app. § 506 (1976).
9. See parts I. B & C infra.
10. SeepartlI.A infra.
11. Copyright protects against both verbatim copying and paraphrasing: one cannot evade the
author's rights by changing his wording while retaining the basic structure of his expression. E.g.,
West Publishing Co. v. EdwardThompson Co., 169 F. 833. 852-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). If the need to
,evoke the novel it is based on justified a film's reliance on a book, the "conjure up" analysis would
entitle movie versions of novels to fair use.
12. See parts I and III infra.
13. E.g.. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.I (2d Cir.).
cert. denied. 439 U.S. 132 (1980); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541. 545 (2d Cir.).
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964).
14. PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1. at 600.
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tion independent of its humor. Thus parody's critical effect should be
central to any affirmative defense against prima facie copyright infringe-
ment.
Criticism has long been grounds for fair use status.15 This comment
argues that parody's value, and its qualification for fair use status, should
be defined by its critical effect. It follows then, that the amount which the
parody should be able to borrow should be measured in terms of this criti-
cal effect: the parodist should be able to borrow the amount necessary to
achieve effectively her work's critical purpose, which is the only reason
for allowing fair use in the first place.
This comment begins with an examination of the fair use doctrine and
its application to parody by courts and commentators. The comment then
shows how most courts have failed to recognize the special place of criti-
cism in parody. It argues that this failure has led courts to inept definitions
of parody which distort its function and obscure its value. The comment
then proposes a test for protecting valid parody, based on the work's criti-
cal effect, and suggests a method which will lead to an equitable balance
between the needs of two art forms when they collide, as they inevitably
must when one work parodies another.
I. THE PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS OF COPYRIGHT
A. Rights and Purposes
United States copyright law gives authors16 a "bundle" of exclusive
rights, including the right to reproduce, distribute and adapt their copy-
righted works.17 The adaptation right, called in the Copyrights Act the
right to prepare derivative works, 18 is especially far-reaching. An author
controls, for example, the right to translations, movie versions, abridg-
ments, "or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted." 19 This statutory language arguably allows an author to con-
15. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. Conn.
1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 520 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); Hill
v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61
(C.C.D. Mass. 1869). The statements in these cases are all dicta, but the lack of litigation involv-
ing truly critical uses is an indication that such uses are widely accepted as fair use. See Comment,
Copyright Fair Use-Case Law & Legislation, 1969 DuKE L.J. 63, 98 n. 142.
16. For simplicity, this comment will refer to the original author as the "author" and the alleged
infringer as the "user," although of course a parodist is also an author. Note also that the author may
have assigned his copyright. But for purposes of this comment, "author" and "copyright holder"
are used interchangeably.
17. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106(1976).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 101.
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trol parodies of a work, since parodists usually do recast, transform, or
adapt their victims' works.2 0
The purpose of this control, however, is not to protect an author's
"natural right" to all the fruits of his intellectual labor.2' Rather, the con-
stitutionally stated aim is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings." 22 The monopoly is based on public policy and is a
means, not an end: the means is an economic incentive to create; the end
is the "Progress of Science."23 Thus the monopoly should give way
when the economic incentive given to authors becomes counterproduc-
tive, retarding rather than promoting progress in the arts and sciences.2 4
B. Judicial Limitations on Copyright
The author's monopoly is far from absolute. 25 Courts have limited the
potentially retarding effects of copyright, accommodating the tensions
between the author's economic incentive and the user's progress-promot-
ing borrowings. First, copyright protection covers only the expression of
the author, not his underlying ideas, precluding monopolization of entire
20. Parody's status as a derivative work means that several rationales that courts and commenta-
tors have advanced to justify calling it fair use are insufficient. See Part II. B infra.
21. See generally Light, Parody. Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copyright. II
CONN. L. REV. 615, 618-21 (1979).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Science." as used in the copyright clause, refers to what we
now call the arts. Copyright originally developed in England as a protection for printers. The idea that
the author's rights were to be protected developed slowly and was the focus of the state copyright
laws existing before 1787. But the Constitutional provision is aimed more at protecting learning than
at the natural rights of authors. See generally Comment, Copyright: Limitations on Exclusive Rights,
Fair Use, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 1041, 1042-46 (1976). For an entertaining discussion of the develop-
ment of copyright in England, see B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEw OF COPYRIGHT (1976).
23. See Mazer v. Stein. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
24. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd by an
equally' divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (value of photocopying to medical research outweighed
detriment to journals thus copied): Berlin v. E.C. Publications. Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). For a first amendment approach to this proposition, see
Comment, First Amendment & Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1158.
1180-8 1. One commentator believes that "Congress may not grant, and the courts may not enforce,
copyright protection which would impede the progress which is the purpose of copyright." Light.
supra note 21, at 622. Surely this goes too far: Congress has granted, and the courts have enforced,
the right of the copyright holder to withhold his creation from the public. See also note 45 and accom-
panying text infra.
25. This is true even in statutory terms. For example, copyright exists for only a limited time. 17
U.S.C. app. § 302 (1976). A perpetual copyright might increase the economic incentive to authors:
the carrot of a perpetual fiefdom for themselves and their posterity. Statutory copyright has never
gone this far, though the present term of author's life plus fifty years creates a domain for at least one
generation of posterity. Prior to 1976, common-law copyright (which applied to unpublished works)
was perpetual. The new Act abolishes common-law copyright and brings all copyright within the
statutory term. Id. § 301. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1180 n. 155.
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realms of thought. 26 Second, a work infringes only when it is "substan-
tially similar" to the original in its mode of expression. 27 Neither of these
limitations would allow freedom for a close parody of a particular work,
however, since parody usually is substantially similar in form to its origi-
nal. 28 The limitation important for parody cases is the doctrine of fair use.
The basic idea of fair use is simple: some uses of copyrighted material
26. If I create, for example, a new method of growing roses, a copyright can prevent others from
reproducing my explanation of the system-the words I use to describe it-but not from using the
basic concepts or explaining the concepts in a different way. Anyone can try to grow roses by my
method; anyone can write a book about my method if he does not use my expression. See Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1897); 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b)
(1976).
27. Professor Nimmer has identified two ways in which a work can be substantially similar. M.
NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03[A].
A. Comprehensive Non-Literal Similarity
Here."the fundamental essense or structure of one work is duplicated in another." Id. at 13-16.
This begins with an inquiry into the level of abstraction of the work's structure. The tale of a princess
who flees a wicked stepmother, is sheltered by peasants, and eventually is rescued by a prince can
take many forms. These bare bones are not "substantially similar." When we add a magic mirror, a
poisoned apple, and seven dwarves, we may have copyrightable expression, especially when the
dwarves whistle a particular song on their way to work. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
The most common test the courts use to decide when a defendant's work is too close to plaintiff's
copyrightable expression is the "audience" or "ordinary observer" test. This test depends on the
idea that if the similarities are instantly apparent to the ordinary observer, defendant must have bor-
rowed too much. There is a certain sense to this, considered in the context of protecting the author's
incentive. If the public sees the similarity instantly, it might confuse the two works and accept them
as interchangeable, leaving the author's economic interest vulnerable and his incentive thereby re-
duced. But for criticism of the test, see M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03[E].
B. Fragmented Literal Similarity
This occurs when defendant does not copy the general pattern of plaintiff's work but does borrow
actual phrasings. Courts here have a more quantitative test: how much has been taken? But there is no
formula which will guide a court's decision. A few lines of prose from plaintiff's voluminous work
may be considered "insubstantial" when found in defendant's similarly voluminous work. But when
the lines are distinctive and go to the core of plaintiff's work, the similarity may be deemed substan-
tial. See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1965);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744, aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980).
28. Satire as a broad genre does not conflict with copyright because of the basic distinction be-
tween idea and expression: satire in general does not depend on borrowing another person's expres-
sion. I cannot copyright the basic idea of satirizing a repressive government by a story set in a barn-
yard, though I can protect the expression "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than
others." See also note 26 supra.
The subgenre of satire known as parody depends for its effect on the similarity to another's work.
But not all parodies mimic a particular work, and here the doctrine of substantial similarity prevents a
conflict with the law. The level-of-abstraction concept, see generally note 27 supra, explains how I
can write a recognizable parody of Faulkner without actually infringing any of his works: I write a
story set in the South, with long sentences and interior monologue about gloom, doom, and incest.
Once I start tracking the plot line of The Sound and the Fury, however, I approach infringement. Of
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are privileged. 29 For example, quoting a work in a book review or schol-
arly article is traditionally a fair use. Seen in the light of the basic pur-
poses of copyright, the idea of fair use makes sense. Copyright contains a
"bundle" of exclusive rights aimed at encouraging an author to create for
the benefit of human progress; fair use creates a much more amorphous
"bundle" of privileges in the user, aimed at ameliorating the monopolis-
tic effects of copyright which can impede progress.
C. The Troublesome Doctrine of Fair Use
This balancing function of fair use is clearly an appropriate approach to
the competing artistic claims of parody and its victims. The courts have
not, however, always explained the doctrine in these balancing terms. 30
In applying it to diverse borrowings, they have instead created a diversity
of rationales. 31 Since the doctrine as a whole has developed through case-
by-case accretion, a particular rationale may work well for one set of facts
course, one of the dangers of the "ordinary observer" test, see generally note 27 supra, is that an
-ordinary" observer, unsophisticated as to the distinction between style and content, could think that
"if it sounds like Faulkner it must be Faulkner" and could find infringement, though no expression is
actually copied. But since most copyright infringement cases are tried to the court, not before a jury.
the "ordinary observer" in copyright is more fictional than usual. See Comment. supra note 15, at
84.
29. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). Fair use is generally
considered an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of infringement. M. NIMER, supra note 8. §
13.05; Comment, supra note 24, at 1165. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976), which first codified the
doctrine, says that fair use is not infringement. But since the predominant concept of fair use today
comes into play only when all the other indicia of infringement are met, it is simpler to think of fair
use as infringement-in-fact which is not actionable due to the doctrine. See Cohen. Fair Use in the
Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 47-48 (1955) (pre-codification article). If fair
use is an affirmative defense, the burden should be on the defendant to show that his use was fair. See
part IV infra. But see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (plaintiff failed to show defendants' use
unfair).
30. Some courts have recognized the relationship between fair use and progress. E.g., Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 822 (1964); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972).
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 520 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1976). In parody
cases. however, this relationship has never been the basis of decision.
31. For example, it has been applied to the use of a fight song in an article about a football team.
KarIl v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941); to photocopying of articles by a
research library, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). aff'd by an
equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); and to the use of a previous work in a biography of
Howard Hughes, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). For a discussion of several of these rationales, see Cohen. supra
note 29.
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but be insufficient to explain another set. Thus, in application the simple
privilege concept has become something of a morass for courts and com-
mentators alike.32
A review of three major rationales which have been used in parody
cases illustrates the problem. One rationale was'simply that some uses are
sanctioned by tradition. 33 This works well for the book review, with the
weight of centuries behind it, but tradition cannot explain the permissible
use of a copyrighted song captured during television coverage of a street
fair. 34 A second rationale was that the author impliedly consented to the
use. 35 But too often a borrowing has a socially desirable function where it
is clear that consent would not be given. 36 Acerbic parody is a case in
point.
Third, some courts have approached fair use by concentrating on what
they term the "purpose" of the use. 37 This is often seen as the subjective
intent of the user: specifically, whether he had a commercial or noncom-
mercial motive for his borrowing. 38 One could presumably quote a noted
throat specialist in the course of medical research, but not in a pamphlet
aimed at selling cigarettes. 39 This distinction between the commercial and
noncommercial purpose of the user is in many cases unworkable. Most
users have some commercial motive; even a scholar is likely to hope his
32. One court called fair use "the most troublesome issue in the whole law of copyright." Dellar
v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). Another has stated: "[The doctrine is
entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis As-
socs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
33. E.g., Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (D. Cal. 1963); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). For a critique of
this rationale, see Cohen, supra note 29, at 51-52.
34. Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The
court used the "effect on the market" rationale. Id. at 70. See generally notes 42-46 and accompany-
ing text infra.
35. E.g., American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Karll v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
36. Another objection is that implied consent is clearly a fiction. An explicit disclaimer of con-
sent will not preclude fair use. M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05.
37. This is still a factor to be considered under the statute. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976),
reprinted in part in text accompanying note 42 infra. For an analysis of fair use which rests on the
user's purpose, see R. Nimmer, Reflections on the Problem of Parody Infringement, 17 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYtP. 133 (1969).
38. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.
Fla. 1978), aff'd on otier grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174-75 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's
Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'dbyan equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
39. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938). For
an explanation of this case in terms of basic policies of copyright, see Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 109 (1967).
169
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works will sell. On the other hand, courts in recent cases have recognized
that some uses with an obvious commercial purpose may still be fair. 40
It is thus clear that the explanation which one court gives for allowing
fair use may be inapplicable in many other fair use situations. 4 1 When
Congress codified the fair use doctrine in 1976, it sought to solve the
problem by using a multi-factor approach. Instead of devising a rationale
for the doctrine, the statute simply lists some traditional types of fair use
and provides four factors the courts "shall" consider in deciding whether
a work is a fair use or an actionable infringement:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes-
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
40. Fair use has been allowed for works of popular scholarship aimed clearly at a mass market.
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307-09 (2d. Cir. 1966). cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 109 (1967), and even for borrowings whose entire intent was for use in comparative
advertising. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers. Inc.. 626 F.2d 1171. 1178
(5th Cir. 1980).
41. Sometimes a court will find a fair use because it is only -incidental" to what the defendant is
doing. E.g.. Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp.. 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
This use, based on a de minimus concept, is not considered more fully here since the copying done by
a parodist is usually central to his endeavor, rather than "incidental." A more recent rationale is
found in a line of cases which stresses the need for the "'public interest in the free dissemination of
information. " E.g., Rosemont Enterprises. Inc. v. Random House, Inc.. 366 F.2d 303. 307 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (biography of Howard Hughes): Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (use of Zapruder film of John F. Kennedy's
assassination in a book on the subject). For a discussion of and criticism of these cases, see Com-
ment. supra note 24. at 1167-77.
This inconsistency has caused some commentators to throw up their hands at the unwieldiness of
fair use and to eschew it entirely in favor of first amendment arguments for borrower privilege. E.g..
Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment
Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Comment, supra note 24. See also Denicola, Cops-
right and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 18 PUBLtSHING
ENTERTAINMENT ADVERTISING L. Q. 242 (1980) (fair use is an internal accommodation to first amend-
ment concerns. but is sometimes inadequate). But the doctrine need not be abandoned: it is itself one
way of accommodating first amendment needs with the requirements of constitutional copyright.
H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). aff'd
sub nora. Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977): Denicola.
supra, at 257-59. The root of the question lies in the constitutional purpose of copyright itself: the
crux of fair use should be how well the use comports with the underlying aim of advancing progress.
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). cert. denied.
385 U.S. 1009 (1967). In any event, the courts have rejected first amendment defenses in copyright
cases. E.g.. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates. 581 F.2d 751. 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied.
439 U.S. 1138 (1979): Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly. 346 F. Supp. 376. 382-84 (D.
Conn. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 520 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848
(1976).
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.42
The fourth factor, which may be called the "substitution effect," is
generally considered the most important.43 The weight given this factor is
in harmony with the basic rationale of copyright, for if a use is unlikely to
affect the potential market, it is unlikely to interfere with the author's
basic incentive to create. 44 The substitution effect is limited in its scope,
however. The effect on the market must arise from the competition of the
copier's work with the original author's, not from adverse criticism which
decreases the public's desire for the original. 45 A derogatory review-or
a biting parody-may devastate sales, but the copyright itself is hurt only
when a work, because of its infringing similarity to the original, tends to
replace or supersede the original. 46
As more of the original is taken, the likelihood of the substitution effect
naturally grows stronger. Thus, courts have often used the amount
taken-the third factor-to decide the case. 47 This ignores the balancing
42. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). In codifying fair use, Congress did not intend to freeze,
change, contract, or expand the case law. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, re-
printed in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 4680; S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 62 (1975).
43. M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05[b][4]. But see Timberg, A Modern Fair Use Codefor tie
Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 193, 221,234 (1980). Some commenta-
tors try to link all the factors-and other rationales-into an argument based on economic competi-
tion. E.g., Denicola, supra note 41, at 264-65.
44. See Comment, supra note 15, at 89. Sometimes a use may even enhance the value of a
copyright by increasing the demand for the original, though this enhancement is not necessary to fair
use. Italian Book Corp. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. In addition, it is important to recognize that the effect is on the potential market, not the
actual one. An author need not prove actual loss to prove infringement. Comment, supra note 15, at
90. The Copyrights Act provides for statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. app. § 504(c) (1976). The poten-
tial market includes all those uses which comprise the bundle of exclusive rights, even those which
plaintiff has chosen not to exploit. M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05[B].
46. B. KAPLAN, supra note 22, at 69; see Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CI. L. REv.
203, 213 (1954). Though the substitution effect is closely related to the underlying rationale of copy-
right, it does not, by itself, provide a complete answer to the problems of fair use. It is not easy to
separate the effect of criticism from the substitution effect, and it is thus difficult to tell when some
substitution has occurred. Suppose that in the course of a highly critical movie review, I reveal in
detail both the plot and surprise ending of the film. Do audiences stay away because of my criticism
or because the synopsis of the plot makes the film itself superfluous? The answer is probably "both."
This comment argues that in such a case, my review deserves the fair use defense, but reliance on the
substitution effect could lead to the opposite result.
47. Courts consider the amount taken to be a factor in two situations: I) when the issue is
whether the taking was "substantial" enough to be actionable infringement at all, see note 27 supra;
and 2) when the issue is whether, given prima facie infringement, so much has been taken as to
preclude fair use. Courts have confused these situations, holding for example that fair use means
insubstantial similarity. E.g., Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.
1943). Or they may hold for defendant on both grounds at once, an inherently contradictory ap-
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role of fair use. If "too much" is taken, fair use may be denied no matter
what social function is being filled by the use. 48 To insist on thus denying
fair use is to say that the aim of providing an author's incentive must
always predominate over the value to society of other progress-enhanced
uses.
This tendency to concentrate on the third factor is a weakness in the
parody cases. To turn the quantity taken and the substitution effect into
touchstones is to confuse "factors" with a rationale. The factors are to be
considered and balanced, it is true, but always in the context of the under-
lying question: does deference to copyright and author's incentive pro-
mote or inhibit progress of the arts?49 When a court attempts to apply the
factors without a rationale for doing so, the correlation between its judg-
ment and copyright policy becomes almost accidental.
II. FAIR USE AND PARODY
Courts today are willing to admit that parody deserves protection. Yet
their acceptance of parody as a fair use is more apparent than real. Out of
the nine recent parody cases, 50 only one actually decided that the work
proach. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), discussed in notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the uneasy
relationship between substantial similarity in the infringement context and in the fair use context, see
Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Substantial SimilaritY, 22 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 81, 99-123 (1977). See also Comment, supra note 15, at 103-07 (using
amount taken in both situations results in duplication of the "demand element" when considering the
substitution effect).
49. By setting up a group of factors which "shall" be considered, see text accompanying note 42
supra, the statute seems to require that all factors be considered in each case, whether or not appropri-
ate to the particular facts. This creates a danger of rote application of factors rather than a considera-
tion of the policies behind fair use. See Comment, supra note 15, at 108. At the very least, it obscures
the subtle relationships between the factors.
50. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.
1979) (topless version of Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders' poster) (fair use merely alleged; insufficient
to allow summary judgment); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (no fair use); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (no prima facie infringement); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiamn, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980) (fair use allowed): Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase
Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (no parody) (preliminary injunction
granted; summary judgment for plaintiff has since been granted, 546 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA), Sept. 17, 1981, at A-I (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1981 & Sept. 5, 1981)); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (2d Cir. 1981) (no parody):
Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no parody):
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (basis of
holding unclear); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). aff'd by an equally
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (no fair use).
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was in fact a parody which deserved fair use protection. But if the courts
are reluctant to base their decision on fair use, they are not hesitant to talk
about it. The cases are larded with dicta.
The problem with many of the parody cases is an undue emphasis on
the amount taken in relation to the copyrighted work. This concern
permeates the cases, 51 to the virtual exclusion of any reasoned considera-
tion of why parody should be privileged at all. In facf, most of the cases
do not ask the initial question: is the work before the court even a parody?
The result has been dependence on a verbal formula-the "conjure
up"doctrine-and a concomitant failure to develop a fair use rationale
tailored to the particular advantages that parody offers to society. An
analysis of the development of this formula reveals both the weaknesses
inherent in its application and the way in which reliance on it has hindered
development of a truly useful rationale.
A. The Emphasis on the Amount Taken
The rule today is that a parodist can take only as much as is necessary
to recall to the audience's mind the subject of the parody. This rule devel-
oped in response to the first modem case to raise the parody defense,
which held that parody was not a fair use. In Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (Gaslight),52 comedian Jack Benny was held to
have infringed the copyright in the movie "Gaslight" by his half-hour
television skit entitled "Autolight." The priginal film was a suspense
drama; the television skit was substantially similar to it in locale, plot-
line, dialogue, and characters. The major difference was that Benny's
version was funny. Defendants therefore claimed that the skit was
burlesque (for legal purposes, a type of parody) and thus fair use. 53 The
court looked instead to established fair use rationales, primarily the skit's
commercial purpose, 54 to hold that parody is to be treated no differently
from any other appropriation. 55
51. Courts sometimes reject fair use because they decide that the work before them is not a
parody. See part III.B infra. But these courts still go on to consider the amount of the taking in dicta,
investigating whether, if the work had been a parody, too much would nonetheless have been taken.
See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
52. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'dby an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
53. Id. at 172.
54. Id. at 183. The court held that an author would not consent to having his work thus used, id.
at 175; that there was no tradition of allowing fair use to commercial unconsented-to parodies, id. at
180; and that the commercial background of the parody (the rivalry between television and the film
industry) precluded fair use. Id. at 181-83.
55. Id. at 183. The Ninth Circuit has expressly repudiated this extreme view. Walt Disney Prods.
v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
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The case was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court and re-
mains the Court's only holding on the subject of parody. Commentators
reacted with instantaneous horror, predicting the death of parody. 56 Yet
before the Gaslight case had even reached the Ninth Circuit, the same
trial court in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting CoY
decided that Sid Caesar's television skit "From Here to Obscurity" did
not infringe the copyright in From Here to Eternity. The opinion is nota-
bly unclear. 58 On the one hand, the court obviously thought its holding
was consistent with that in Gaslight, suggesting that there was not enough
similarity to constitute even prima facie infringement. 59 On the other
hand, it said that burlesque "historically" used part of the original to
"conjure up" its target. 60 How much farther the parodist may go was
even less clear. 61 The amount taken must be "small" and the parody can
only go "somewhat farther.' 62 The opinion does have the virtue of link-
ing the words "fair use" and "parody," which the same court had re-
fused to do in Gaslight.63 Beyond that, it leaves unanswered even the
56. E.g., Yankwich, supra note 1. at 1152; Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement. 56 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 585 (1956); Comment, Parody and the Law of Copyright. 29 FORD-A,,M L. REV. 570
(1961), Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright Infringement?. 12 VAND. L. REv. 459
(1959). The defendants in Gaslight raised the same fear. 131 F. Supp. at 185.
57 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
58. The opinion is unclear partly because the trial court assumed that the decision would be
appealed. It thus felt that it was merely making a few admittedly hurried "'remarks . . intended to
assist counsel in the preparation of findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment." Id. at 349. In
fact. the case was never appealed.
59. The court found this an "excellent companion case for Loew's." which "'testied] [Loew's]
general principle and ... dictum." Id. at 351. The skit used material from the movie, but "[t]here is
no substantial similarity between said burlesque and said motion picture." Id. at 352.
60. Id. at 350, 352.
61. The court was unclear about what part a "substantial" taking plays in deciding fair use. In
places it seemed to revert to the old idea-now generally disregarded-that fair use is simply another
term for insubstantial, i.e., non-infringing taking: "The doctrine of fair use permits burlesque to go
somewhat farther so long as the taking is not substantial." ld. at 350. If fair use is seen as an affirma-
tive defense to otherwise prima facie infringement, it is difficult to see why it is needed if the taking is
not substantial in the first place. See M. NItMER. supra note 8, § 13.05. In other places, the court
actually seemed to mean that a parodist can copy more than a serious borrower; the "line is drawn
more strictly" for serious works borrowing from other serious works than for a "farce or comedy or
burlesque" taking from "a serious copyrighted work or vice versa." 137 F. Supp. at 350. The "vice
versa" is particularly obscure.
62. 137 F. Supp. at 350. At one point, the court suggested that a burlesque might take "an
incident of the copyrighted story, a developed character . . . a title . . . some small . . . part of the
development of the story, [and] . . . possibly some small amount of the dialogue." Id. But parodists
cannot depend on this list, for if the amount taken is not, in toto, "'small." then the burlesque "runs a
calculated risk, that . . . a trier of fact may find the taking substantial." Id. Not surprisingly, the list
reflects what Caesar had happened to take in this skit, a skit the court simply found inoffensive: "the
defendant has taken a small part and then ' "[taken] off into the blue." Id. at 351 (quoting Dr.
Frank Baxter's testimony in Gaslight, 131 F. Supp. at 183).
63. See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
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threshold question: what if a parodist needs more than a "small" taking
to accomplish her conjuring up?
Nevertheless, the idea that a parody can "conjure up" its original is
now accepted dogma. Ironically, the strongest and most cited statement
of the doctrine was purest dictum. In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 64
Mad Magazine had printed a series of satiric lyrics to be sung to the tunes
of popular songs; for example, "The Last Time I Saw Paris" was
transmuted to "The Last Time I Saw Maris," a ditty about a then-current
baseball hero. The court found that so little had been borrowed-just the
"occasional phrase from the original lyrics in the occasional song"65-
that there was not even prima facie infringement under a strict interpreta-
tion of Gaslight. But the court respected the parodist's need for freedom,
and so it went on to say:
At the very least, where ... it is clear that the parody has neither the intent
nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the paro-
dist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is neces-
sary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his satire, a finding of infringe-
ment would be improper. 66
Because the amount taken in Berlin was so small as not to be even prima
facie infringement, the court did not address the question of how much
was legitimately "necessary" to conjure up the object of the satire.
The courts now had their formula. But they lacked a rationale for ap-
plying it beyond a vague sense of goodwill towards an art form they ac-
knowledged was venerable. When the content of the parody became less
socially acceptable than pratfalls and jibes at baseball players, the conjure-
up test showed its weakness.
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,67 defendants had published
a comic book in which Mickey Mouse and other Disney characters Were
portrayed in a very un-Disney-like way-as free-loving, drug-taking hip-
pies. They argued that this parody would not have the effect of substitut-
ing for the original, so that they should be allowed considerable freedom
to borrow. The court rejected this argument explicitly, along with any
notion that the amount of the taking was irrelevant. 68 Instead, it stated
that "very little" was necessary to conjure up Mickey Mouse, since
"when the medium involved is a comic book, a recognizable caricature is
64. 329 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822(1964).
65. Id. at 543. The court also noted that some titles (in twisted form) and the meter had been
borrowed. But "we doubt that even so eminent a composer as plaintiff Irving Berlin should be per-
mitted to claim a property interest in iambic pentameter." Id. at 545.
66. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
67. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132(1979).
68. Id. at 756.
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not difficult to draw .... By copying the images in their entirety, defen-
dants took more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader's mind
the parodied work .... "69 Thus, defendants had infringed.
Defendants argued that they took no more than was necessary to
achieve their parodic effect. Because the parody was of the ideas that
Mickey specifically stood for, the character had to be clearly Mickey, not
just some similar mouse. 70 Defendants further argued that:
in the context of parody, [the allowable] taking is required not only to "con-
jure up" the original, but also to provide the comic element itself which is
derived largely from the shock of the unexpected parody elements in the
midst of the completely familiar elements of the original. 71
Here the familiar elements of the original lay in the graphic depiction of
the characters and their names; in nearly every other aspect, such as plot,
personality, or dialogue, the two versions were different. 72
The court's "short answer" 73 to this argument shows the weakness of
the conjure-up test:
[W]hen persons are parodying a copyrighted work, the constraints of the
existing precedent do not permit them to take as much of a component part
as they need to make the "best parody." Instead their desire to make the
"best parody" is balanced against the rights of the copyright owner .... 74
This statement amounts to holding that parody is to be allowed only if it is
sloppy work. Yet the very reason parody should be fair use lies in its
importance to the progress of the arts. Such progress will not be encour-
aged by allowing only ineffective parody.
In the only case actually holding that a parody is fair use, the Second
Circuit seemed to be moving away from the grudging view of conjure up
shown in Air Pirates. In Elsinere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co.,75 the cast of "Saturday Night Live" had borrowed two words and
four notes from New York's advertising campaign song: "I Love New
York" became "I Love Sodom." The trial court found that defendants
69. Id. at 757-58.
70. Brief for Appellant at 26. The court replied that all that was necessary was to -'parallel- the
characters "'in a manner that conjured up the particular elements of the innocence of the characters
that were to be satirized." 581 F.2d at 758.
71. Brief for Appellant at 20.
72. 581 F.2d at 753.
73. Id. at 758.
74. Id.
75. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1132(1980).
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had taken the "heart of the composition," a prima facie infringement. 76
Still, the phrase lasted only eighteen seconds and "[could] not be said to
be clearly more than was necessary to 'conjure up' the original.' "77 Thus
the taking was fair use.
Plaintiffs argued that repeating the phrase several times went beyond
conjure up; viewers could recognize the original after the first time. The
trial court replied that this repetition served its own parodic purposes. 78
On appeal, the Second Circuit developed this idea:
[T]he concept of "conjuring up" an original [did not come] into the copy-
right law.., as a limitation on how much of an original may be used ....
A parody is entitled at least to "conjure up" the original. Even more exten-
sive use would still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the origi-
nal, using the original as a known element of modem culture and contribut-
ing something new for humorous effect or commentary. 79
B. The Continuing Lack of a Useful Rationale
In the course of developing and applying the conjure-up doctine, the
courts have alluded to several reasons for allowing parodists to take
enough to conjure up their originals and commentators have developed
each of these. One suggestion was that parody deserves special treatment
simply because of its long history as a separate art form. 80 A related idea
was that since parody involves a good deal of independent effort and ori-
ginality-in addition to its borrowing-it should have independent sta-
tus. 81
Neither of these explanations is sufficient in itself: they both ignore the
fact that parody, as an adaptation of the original, falls within the statutory
definition of a derivative work. Other types of derivative works, such as
translation, have a long history; other types, such as film, are independent
art forms requiring independent effort and originality. Yet no one could
suggest, in the case of film or translation, that this history or originality
76. Id. at 744. For a discussion of courts' approaches to substantiality when faced with a short
musical motif, see Sherman, supra note 47, at 104-12.
77. 482 F. Supp. at 747.
78. Id.
79. 623 F.2d 252, 253 n. 1. This is a very weak expansion of the doctrine: a footnote to a one
paragraph per curiam opinion. It does, however, recognize the straightjacket put on parody by the
conjure-up doctrine.
80. Yankwich, supra note 1, at 1133; Note, 12 VAND. L. REV., supra note 56, at461.
81. E.g., R. Nimmer, supra note 37, at 135; Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38
U. CoLO. L. REV. 550, 553 (1966). British courts have used ihe idea of an original result flowing
from independent effort as a rationale for allowing parody "fair dealing" status. For a discussion of
British parody cases, see id. at 554-58.
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makes fair use out of what is firmly within the rights reserved to the au-
thor of a source work. 82
A third reason lies in the fact that parody is often funny: the Second
Circuit in Elsnere affirmed the trial court because "in today's world of
often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the
humor of parody.''83 Allowing fair use for merely funny adaptations
would also encroach severely on the author's derivative work rights. To
allow all things funny to fall into the net of protected parody could lead to
the result feared by the Ninth Circuit in the Gaslight case: "[A]ny indi-
vidual or corporation could appropriate, in its entirety, a serious and fa-
mous dramatic work, protected by copyright, merely by introducing
comic devices of clownish garb, or movement, or facial distortion of the
actors, and presenting it as burlesque.' '84
One argument proposed by commentators and gaining some recogni-
tion in the courts is that parody deserves fair use because it is unlikely that
anyone would buy the parody instead of the original. 85 A panel of the
Second Circuit has recently split on this question. In MCA, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 86 defendants had produced a musical which included a song entitled
"The Cunnilingus Champion of Company C." This was clearly intended
as a take off on "The Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B." 87 The
majority emphasized defendant's commercial intent, harking back to the
arguments of the Gaslight case. The opinion noted that "plaintiffs and
defendants were competitors in the entertainment field. Both Bugle Boy
and Cunnilingus Champion were performed on the stage. Both were sold
as recordings. Both were sold in printed copies." 88 The court concluded
that, in these circumstances, the parody 89 could not be fair use.
The dissent, in contrast, would have allowed fair use because
[a] raucous and explicitly sexual satire is not a substitute for the innocence
of Bugle Boy. I therefore cannot agree with the majority's "premise that the
songs were competing works," . . . or that the sale or rendition of defen-
dants' song would interfere with the marketability of plaintiff's song. 90
82. Films and translations are both specifically mentioned in the statutory definition of derivative
works. 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
83. 623 F.2d at 253.
84. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956). aff'd bv an equally divided court,
356 U.S. 43 (1958).
85. E.g., Light, supra note 21. at 634-35.
86. 211U.S.P.Q. (BNA)577(2dCir. 1981).
87. A cast member testified "how it would be funny if we could get 'Cunnilingus Champion' to
sound similar to 'Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy' just to create some publicity." MCA. Inc. v. Wilson.
425 F. Supp. 443. 448 (1976).
88. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 581.
89. The court may actually have decided that "Champion" was not a parody at all. See notes
132-39 and accompanying text infra.
90. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 586 (Mansfield, J.).
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The dissent is probably right, factually, but the reasoning is again in-
consistent with parody's derivative-work quality. Few potential readers
of The Sound and the Fury are likely to buy a Finnish version of it, but
Faulkner's estate still owns the translation rights and can prosecute unau-
thorized translators.
The dissent depends on a naive view of the "effect on the market"
factor in fair use;91 thus viewed, this factor is not useful for parody, im-
portant as it is for other types of fair use. 92 Courts need to consider a
rationale for parody which allows it freedom despite its nature as a deriva-
tive work.
Some commentators have suggested that parody should be privileged
because it is a use of the work that the author is unlikely to authorize. 93
This argument is unsatisfactory, too, because normally copyright in-
cludes the right to withhold a work from the public. 94 Still, this rationale
implicitly recognizes the important kernel of truth: parodies are critical.
III. THE CRITICAL FUNCTION OF PARODY
This comment argues that the courts have for the most part ignored the
critical quality of parody, either in their evaluation of a parodist's borrow-
ing or, indeed, in their very definition of parody. 95 Yet it is precisely this
element that separates parody from other merely humorous adaptations.
Furthermore, it is precisely this element which fits parody into fair use in
a way that is consistent with the basic policy of copyright. To understand
91. A related argument is that parody will rarely affect the value of a copyright and may enhance
it by stimulating interest in the original. See note 44 supra. Thus, goes the argument, it should be fair
use without regard to the amount taken. See, e.g., Harmon, Recent Developments in Ninth Circuit
Patent and Copyright Law, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 453, 464 (1980); Light, supra note 21, at
634-35. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the derivative-work quality of parody. A
film version may stimulate interest in a book, but it is not thereby fair use.
92. The effect on the market may be very important when considering an "incidental" type of
fair use. See note 41 supra. A more sophisticated view of this factor says that when the functions (as
opposed to the audiences) of the use and the original are different, there will be minimal effect on the
market, and fair use is permissible. See M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05[B]. This comment argues
that true parody does serve a different function from its target, so to this extent the effect-on-the-
market factor has some explanatory power. See text accompanying notes 96-111 infra.
93. E.g., Light, supra note 21; Rosette, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, 9 ASCAP Copy-
RIHT L. SYMP. 1, 27 (1956).
94. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184-85 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
95. Although many commentators have noted parody's critical function, none has yet made it the
center of analysis. E.g., Light, supra note 21; R. Nimmer, supra note 37; Rosette, supra note 93;
Yankwich, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 81; Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 56. One
commentator has actually rejected parody's critical function as important to the analysis. Comment,
supra note 56, at 572.
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the importance of this critical element, it is first necessary to examine fair
use more closely from the point of view of the policies behind the whole
copyright scheme. This will lead to a clearer understanding of why those
courts which have attempted to define parody have in all but one case
erred.
A. The Place of Criticism in Fair Use Doctrine
1. A Proposed Fair Use Analysis
Consideration of the fair use doctrine demonstrates that balancing fac-
tors need not be the only way of looking at fair use. An alternative
method is a purposive analysis, based on the societal purposes served by
copyright law. 96 Under this approach, courts would decide what pur-
poses, as a group, deserve protection because they are more important to
society than protecting the borrowed work. As long as a borrowing fulfills
these purposes, the quantity taken, or even the possibility of a substitution
effect, would be irrelevant. Criticism is the best example of such a pur-
pose.
The copyright statute recognizes "purpose of the use" as a factor in
determining fair use. Although this may refer to the user's subjective in-
tent in borrowing, the statute also lists examples of the types of uses
which can evoke fair use: "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
I scholarship, or research. 97 This list embodies societal purposes,
uses which embody societal policy judgments that their purposes are valid
intrusions on the copyright monopoly more valuable than the author's in-
centive. 98 Defined in this sense, these can be called "fair use purposes" 99
96. This would be analogous to the method of "definitional balancing" suggested in some first
amendment cases. See Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F.L. REv.
564. 578-79 (1976); Comment, supra note 24, at 1185 n. 170.
97. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). One commentator has suggested that the first factor "would be
applied to determine whether the use was one within the scope of the public interest such as specified
ii the preamble to § 107." Comment, supra note 22, at 1053. Since the factor mentions specifically
"commercial and noncommercial uses" it is likelier that it reflects the cases which consider commer-
cial use as highly suspect. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra. Although the first factor
was gleaned from case law, consideration of purpose in the light of the uses mentioned in the pream-
ble assures that the factor's mention of "commercial purposes" need not freeze the court's considera-
tion in light of this ease law.
98. See Comment, supra note 15, at 91-92.
99. Of course, in one sense this is merely a list of labels. Simply labeling one's borrowing as
"news reporting" or "scholarship" should not automatically result in fair use. See Wainwright Sec..
Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1977). Similarly, mere allegation that
one's work is a parody is insufficient to justify the fair use defense. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979). See Comment, supra lote 15.
at 98. This commentator also suggests looking at first amendment principles and at case law to deter-
mine what uses are, in their nature, fair. Id. at 95-96, 99.
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and if the effect of a particular work is to further one of them in a bona
fide way, 100 the courts should call the use fair.
An examination of the list of these "fair use purposes" shows that they
promote two interests important to society: 1) an interest in analysis and
criticism of society's intellectual store,' ol and 2) an interest in allowing
thinkers to build on what has gone before, an interest in the evolutionary
growth of thought.102 The court, in its process of definitional balancing,
should treat these two interests differently.
Professor Nimmer's "functional" approach to fair use helps explain
why different treatmients are needed. 103 Fair use, he says, should be al-
lowed when the function of a use is different from that of the source. 104 A
work which criticizes another-which promotes society's interest in
analysis and criticism-has (insofar as it criticizes) by definition a func-
tion which is different from that of the source: the point of criticism is to
analyze and comment upon the thing being criticized. In contrast, a work
which promotes the interest in the evolutionary growth of thought-what
might be called an informational use-may well have the same function
as the source. For example, when a scientist quotes as part of her research
the heart of her predecessor's research on microbes, she is using his
words, at that moment, for the same purpose that he was: to convey infor-
mation about microbes. Similarly, a news report of a copyrighted speech
quotes it to convey the information conveyed by the speech.
An informational use may or may not further a fair use purpose, de-
pending on what more is done with the borrowing. 105 The courts in these
cases must turn to the four fair use factors to determine whether the bor-
100. "Bona fide," of course, suggests a subjective component. But once a fair use purpose is
defined, an objective test can be used to determine whether a particular work qualifies: whether a
"reasonable person" would perceive the work as fulfilling a fair use purpose. See note 153 and
accompanying text infra. See also Yankwich, supra note 1, at 1152.
101. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ( No. 4,901). See
also cases cited in note 15 supra.
102. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); West Publishing Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 866
(E.D.N.Y. 1909), decree modified, 176 F. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1910); H. BALL, supra note 29, at 259;
Comment, supra note 24, at 1179.
103. M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05[B].
104. Id.
105. For example, a scientist may illuminate previous microbe research by her discussion of her
own contributions or the newspaper may place the quoted speech in the context of the larger issues it
raises. But simply using an extract in a case book on microbes would probably not be fair use, since it
does nothing to go beyond the informational function of the source. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v.
Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (court contrasted news report adding
commentary to quoted materials with abstract of same materials simply condensing them). See also
Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965).
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rowing is a bona fide fair use. 106 In contrast, a critical use would be fair
use per se; criticism performs a different function from and does not sub-
stitute for the original. 107 When a critic quotes a line of poetry to show
that a poet has poor control of his meter, the only reason for quoting is to
make the criticism.
Thus criticism should be considered in itself a fair use purpose. Insofar
as the critical aspect dominates the use, the amount taken should be irrele-
vant. 08 A critic should be able to quote a poem in its entirety as long as
this is necessary to further the critical purpose. 109 This may lead to the
possibility of some substitution effect; a reader may find his desire for the
poem sated by reading it in the critic's work." 0 But using copyright to
stifle effective criticism would retard social progress more than enhance
it, and so here the author's incentive should give way.
True parody is satiric, and satire is a form of criticism. Thus a court's
first inquiry on considering a parody defense should be to ask whether the
106. The danger of making an informational use fair use per se is illustrated in Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 385 U.S. 1009
(1967). There, the court found a quotation in a biography was fair use despite the commercial nature
of the biography. The court distinguished Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302 (ED. Pa. 1938). where a cigarette manufacturer was held liable for quoting a scientist's
research because the manufacturer's use was not designed to advance science or art. In Rosemont, the
commercial use did advance science or art. 366 F.2d at 309. But this approach leads the court into a
jungle of value judgments: When is the commercially motivated work "art" and when is it not? It is
wiser to consider all the factors, including the amount taken and the substitution effect, when the
function of the copied extract is at least initially the same in the user's and the author's work. This
approach was taken in Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), where summary judgment
for defendant was reversed. Here, defendant had used copyright letters of the Rosenbergs in his book
about their trial. The trial court had based its decision on the public interest in full knowledge about
the trial. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd. 560 F.2d 1061
(2d cir. 1977). The Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiff should have a chance to prove the substitu-
tion effect.
107. Criticism is also traditionally protected under the first amendment. Comment. supra note
24, at 1185-86.
108. See Comment, supra note 15, at 106-07.
109. See Comment, supra note 15, at 102-03; Note, 12 VAND. L. REV., supra note 56. at
469-70. Courts have rejected, without really analyzing, the idea that a verbatim copying can be fair
use. E.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
authority most often cited is Leon v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
Leon involved a copying of a telephone directory and hence is cited for its precedential weight, not
because its rationale necessarily fits the case before the court. As a rule of thumb. the disfavor of
verbatim copying is consistent with the test proposed here. The crucial aspect of this test lies in the
necessity of the borrowing to the criticism. Particularly for longer works, it may be impossible to
show that verbatim copying of the whole work was really required. Since fair use is an affirmative
defense, see note 29 supra. the burden should be on defendant to show the necessity. See part IV
infra. But the rule should be one of thumb, not an iron glove.
110. See Comment. supra note 15, at 96.
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work has a critical effect. If it does, then the amount taken should be
judged in terms of the needs of the parody and its criticism. 111
2. Judicial Treatment of Critical Values in Parody Cases
The suggestion that parody has critical value has not fared well in the
courts until recently. The court in the Gaslight case recognized that
"'[c]riticism is an important and proper exercise of fair use." 112 But be-
cause it emphasized the testimony of defendant's own expert witness that
burlesque is basically lighthearted, a "happy toying with serious
things"'l 3 -the court did not accept the connection between burlesque
and criticism. In Air Pirates, too, the court assumed that the work before
it was a parody, 14 but brushed off arguments that the work's criticism
was important with the deprecating comment that defendants "suppos-
edly sought to convey an allegorical message of significance." 115
In Columbia Pictures, the "From Here to Obscurity" case, the court
was impressed with the idea that "burlesque is a recognized form of liter-
ary art" and that this particular burlesque is a "new, original and differ-
ent literary work."11 6 Yet neither of these is a strong reason for allowing
parodists the fair use defense," 7 since neither is a reason for allowing the
fair use privilege for other derivative works. At trial there had been expert
testimony on parody's critical role. 118 Yet the court remained oblivious to
111. See Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 56, at 594. This view requires looking at the
amount taken from the point of view of defendant's work. It should be remembered that we are here
considering the amount taken in the context of fair use, not of prima facie infringement. In consider-
ing substantial similarities leading to infringement itself, the rule is to consider the amount taken in
relation to plaintiff's work, not defendant's. M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.03[B]. For the reasons
behind this rule, see Sherman, supra note 47, at 102-03. However, when parody raises the fair use
defense, it has already been decided that its similarity is substantial enough to be actionable.
112. 131 F. Supp. at 175. The court also recognized that more liberal taking was allowable in the
arts and sciences, so that progress would not be "retarded," but declined to include parody as an art.
Id.
113. Id. at 181 n.46. It is possible that "Autolight" was in fact merely broad humor and not
critical parody. If so, the decision may have been a sound one on its facts. See Brief for Appellant,
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). The Ninth Circuit remarked that the contention that the
burlesque was literary criticism "would [itself] seem to be a parody upon the meaning of criticism."
239 F.2d at 537.
114. 581 F.2d at 756.
115. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
116. 137 F. Supp. at 352.
117. See part II.B. supra.
118. Dr. Smith's extended testimony . . . is informative and captivating, but most of it is
beside the point. Its only impact in the case at bar could be on the question of whether the
television showing of "From Here to Obscurity" is a true burlesque. How that determination
aids us in a solution in this case is difficult to see.
137 F. Supp. 350 (emphasis added). This comment, of course, argues that whether or not a parody is
a "true" one is not "beside" the point; it is the whole point.
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the importance of the critical function. The decision thus lacks sound pol-
icy underpinnings for permitting borrowing by parodists.
Only one court has fully recognized the importance of parody's critical
effect. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Pro-
ductions, Inc., 119 defendant had produced a musical called "Scarlett
Fever" based on the movie "Gone with the Wind." The court, in grant-
ing a preliminary injunction, recognized that mere humor was an insuffi-
cient ground for allowing fair use. 120 In response to a parody defense, the
court defined parody and satire as "art forms involv[ing] the type of origi-
nal critical comment meant to be protected by § 107."12 1 Though some
aspects of the musical were satirical, the overall effect was of a musical
comedy version of the filmJ2 2 -in fact, a derivative work firmly within
the author's exclusive right to "do or authorize."' 23 The court thus re-
jected the parody defense, not because of the amount taken124 but because
the work was not a parody.
The court thus recognized that parody's privilege depends on a ration-
ale which distinguishes it from other forms of derivative work. Origi-
nality of effort and historical tradition, both qualities of many derivative
works, are insufficient. Criticism provides the necessary, better grounded
rationale. Just as a critical use of some verbatim copying is privileged in a
book review, so the critical function of parody should allow use of a work
which would be merely derivative, absent the criticism.
B. The Problem of Definition
Misled by the concern for the amount taken and by a dependence on the
conjure up formula, most courts have ignored the "threshold question of
whether the work is a parody or satire." 125 The few that have considered
definitions have raised two related issues which they have resolved in un-
119. 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979). sum. judgment granted, 546 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT
J., (BNA), Sept. 17. 1981, at A-I (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1981 and Sept. 5, 1981).
120. Id. at 357.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 360. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
124. The court went on to consider the "conjure up" issue in dicta. 479 F. Supp. at 358-61.
Using the four fair use factors, the court concluded that had the play been a parody, it still would have
been denied fair use. Id. at 358. In doing so, the court fell back into the restricted "conjure up"
analysis, stating that since the plot and characters of "Gone with the Wind" were so well known,
very little need have been taken to "conjure up" the film or novel. Id. at 359. Had the court found
"Scarlett Fever" to be a parody the court might have found itself forced into an Air Pirates position:
though recognizing the critical value of the work, it would be required by the conjure up doctrine to
say that this criticism should have been achieved in a less effective way.
125. Id. at 357.
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satisfactory ways. First, can a work still be defined as a parody even if its
criticism is aimed at society generally and not just at the borrowed
work? 126 Second, if the entire work is copied in the parody, can the bor-
rowing work still be defined as parody? 27 The courts have answered
"no" to each question, but these refusals depend on assumptions which
fall when parody's critical function is recognized.
1. Defining Parody by its Target
In MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 128 the district court took a narrow view of how
parody should be defined. It obliquely recognized that parody is critical,
but found it decisive that the song "was not intended to be a parody of
'Bugle Boy' [the original work] in the sense of taking 'Bugle Boy' out of
context in an attempt to hold it up to ridicule." 129 The criticism, in other
words, was not aimed at the original work. Defendants claimed that
Champion, their parody, was burlesque, aimed at "sexual mores and
taboos," and "meant to project the message that sex is good, clean and
wholesome." 1'30 The court held that this purpose, a criticism of society's
mores generally, was not justification for the taking; only a direct parody
of the original could be considered a fair use. 131
In affirming the trial court's finding of infringement, 132 the Second Cir-
cuit illustrated once again the narrowing influence of the conjure up doc-
trine. Modifying slightly the trial court's strict view of parody's targets;
the majority admitted that parody may "reflect life in general" as well as
skewer its original. "However, if the Champion song is not at least in.
part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it up." 1 33
As the dissent pointed out, this reasoning is fallacious. Defendants
might have a logical reason for conjuring up a song without intending to
parody the song itself. The dissent asserted:
[I]n my view, the defendants ... produce[d] what amounts to sexual satire
or burlesque of contemporary mores by putting a comic or humorous twist
on the more conventional Bugle Boy and by parodying the Andrews Sisters'
style, which depended heavily on "boogie-woogie" music . . . . Defen-
126. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
577 (2d Cir. 1981).
127. Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N;Y. 1975).
128. 425 F. Supp, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 211 U.S.P.Q._(BNA) 577 (2d Cir. 1981). See
notes 87-90 and accompanying text supra.
129. Id.at453.
130. Id. at 453 &n.18.
131. Id.
132. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577 (2d Cir. 1981). The damage award was modified.
133. Id. at 581.
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dants made limited use of Bugle Boy to create a new and (to many) humor-
ous effect.... The humorous twist would not exist if the "boogie woogie"
sound of the original.., were not recalled. 134
The dissent had a broader view of the permissible aims of parody. Yet
though defendants may have had a logical reason for their use of the origi-
nal song-recalling a mood by the type of music used-it was not neces-
sarily a sound one in this case. Though the dissent called Champion a
"satire" it clearly found the song's value in its humor and originality. As
has been demonstrated, 35 a work does not deserve the fair use privilege
simply because it is new or funny, even if it takes barely enough to con-
jure up the original.
The problem in Wilson, then, was not in the use of the original to recall
the forties; rather, the problem was that the evidence fails to show that
defendants borrowed for a truly critical purpose. 136 There is little in the
opinion, other than the conclusory terms such as "burlesque" and
"spoof," to show that Champion had any critical effect. Consequently.
the finding of infringement would be correct, although the court's reason-
ing was wrong.
The majority's opinion is unfortunate because it supports the proposi-
tion that only direct spoofs of an original can be considered parody. 137 In
134. Id. at 584,586 (Mansfield, J.)..
135. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra.
136. The majority may have sensed this problem. It noted that:
Defendants' argument in short is that, because Cunnilingus Champion "'deals with the humor-
ous practice of cunnilingus" and Wilson was trying to portray that practice as "'joyous". he was
entitled to use a competing copyright owner's music that was "'immediately identifiable as
something happy and joyous and it brought back a certain period in our history when we felt that
way.
211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 580.
137. This is simply wrong from a literary point of view: consider the multitudes of parodies of an
author's style rather than of a particular work. Of course, this type of parody creates no copyright
problem. See note 28 supra. Furthermore, a parody which does closely track the original's wording
and structure can quite legitimately carry social criticism without criticizing the original. For exam-
ple. a recent political cartoon portrays James Watt playing a guitar and singing:
This land is your land, this land is my land
From the offshore oil rigs ... to the strip mined mountains...
From the redwood saw mills ... to the toxic land fills...
This land is owned by industry.
Cartoon by Mike Peters, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 30, 1981, at 23. The target here is clearly Watt's
philosophy and not the original song, since the parody is more in sympathy with the philosophy
behind the original than critical of it.
Another district court in the Second Circuit had rejected the strict holding of Wilson in dicta. In
Elsmere Music. Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.). aff'dpercurian.
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980), plaintiffs claimed that "'I Love Sodom"
did not directly parody -'I Love New York", relying on Wilson. The court rejected this argument and
went on to say that in any event there need not be "an identity between the song copied and the
subject matter of the parody." pointing out that the substance of the songs parodied in Berlin v. E.C.
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a decision granting summary judgment for plaintiffs in Showcase Atlanta,
the court followed Wilson in defining parody's social value as critical
commentary "upon the work being parodied.' '138 These courts' narrow
definition cuts off too many potentially privileged uses without allowing
full inquiry into whether the use fulfills a bona fide fair use function such
as criticism. When the emphasis is placed on the function of the borrow-
ing, it is clear that, whatever the target of the criticism, parody's essential
critical ingredient results in a function different from that of the original,
making fair use appropriate. 139
2. Verbatim Taking as Parody
It is tempting for a court to find that a parody cannot be fair use if it
copies the whole work. After all, even if one looks to the critical effect,
one's initial reaction is to say that a parody of a particular work requires
some changes from the original or there is nothing which results in the
criticism. 140 Closer analysis, however, shows that this need not always be
the case. A work may be parodied by context alone. Consider, for exam-
ple, an anti-war review in which the song "The Ballad of the Green Ber-
ets" is performed by suitably attired gorillas. Properly done, the staging
could be an effective critical commentary of the values underlying the
song.
Verbatim copying can thus result in valid criticism. It is thus mislead-
ing to limit the definition of parody to satirical works which take only part
of the original. Unfortunately, the court in Walt Disney Productions v.
Mature Pictures Corp., 141 another case involving Disney creations, took
this limited approach. Defendants in Mature used the "Mickey Mouse
March" in its entirety in an unusual context-as background music in the
film "The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker." While the March
played and three actors wearing only Mouseketeer hats sang, "the female
protagonist ... appear[ed] to simultaneously gratify the sexual drive of
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), had nothing to do with
Mad Magazine's lyrics. The Elsmere court did not, however, elaborate its reasons for rejecting the
Wilson definition. Now that the Second Circuit has affirmed Wilson, there may not need to be "iden-
tity" between the original and the subject matter of the parody, but there must be some overlap.
138. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 546 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA), Sept. 17, 1981, at A-I (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1981 and Sept. 5, 1981). The court was relying
on the district court opinion in Wilson.
139. The burden of proving that a particular taking for general social criticism was necessary to
that criticism should be heavier than in the case of direct parody. See part IV.B. infra.
140. This is closely related to the analysis leading to a definition restricted to direct parody of a
work. Such analysis requires comment "upon" the work being parodied.
141. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
187
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.. . three other actors." 142 The defendants stressed humor rather than
criticism as their aim. 143 Nevertheless the court did not address the pur-
pose of the taking; instead, it called on the conjure up test and held that
because more than necessary to conjure up was taken, the work was not a
parody. 144
A court which takes the Mature approach, simply rejecting the idea
that parody exists if the entire work is appropriated, completely confuses
the issues of definition and allowable quantity. This makes impossible
critical commentary by context no matter how biting it may be, and rig-
idly limits society's access to criticism without sound reason. If an au-
thor's right to control derivative works can be invaded for critical pur-
poses, as it is when non-verbatim parody is privileged, there seems no
good reason why the author's right to reproduce or perform an entire
work should not be similarly limited if a valid fair use purpose is fur-
thered.
The cases in which a whole work needs to be taken to create the critical
effect will be relatively rare, especially when the use is as a critical com-
ment on society and not on the work itself. To show both that the vehicle
is closely connected to the criticism and that the whole work is necessary
to the effect would be a heavy burden for a defendant. But fair use should
not be denied if defendants can meet this burden and show that their ver-
batim taking is a parody and manages to fulfill a critical function. 1
45
IV. A PROPOSED CRITICAL EFFECT TEST
This comment has argued that the approaches most courts have taken in
parody cases have been narrow and unrelated to the basic idea that the
major aim of copyright is to promote the progress of the arts. Resting on
the flawed substantiality of taking concept, these approaches ignore the
critical purpose of true parody and inhibit the court's inquiry into whether
a particular work fulfills that purpose. A better approach would focus on
142. Id. at 1397. It seems probable that, given this tri-partite gratification, any critical effect was
lost in other effects. The court's result in Mature is not necessarily wrong, but its analysis is mislead-
ing.
143. The idea was to "highlight and emphasize the transition of... teenagers from childhood to
manhood ... in a highly comical setting." Id. at 1398.
144. Id.
145. The burden should be on defendant. See note 29 supra. It may be so heavy as to result.
practically speaking, in a per se exclusion of extensive use for purposes of parody when the criticism
is of society, not the work parodied. See notes 151 & 153 and accompanying text infra.
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the function of parody 46 and would determine the limits of the parodist's
freedom to borrow in terms of that function. 147
The basic premise of the suggested approach is that parody deserves
fair use protection because of its critical function, a function which pro-
motes society's progress. Given this premise, the courts should make a
two-step inquiry. First, they must decide if the work in question is a true
parody. If the work has the requisite critical effect to be true parody, the
next step is to determine whether the defendant has taken more than is
necessary to achieve this effect. Anything which is taken that is not nec-
essary to the critical effect falls outside the fair use rationale which pro-
tects a work of criticism. This creates a limitation on the power of the
parodist to copy, but it is a limitation based on the needs of his social
function, not (as with the conjure up test) on the unexamined "rights" of
the copyright holder.
A. Determining the Critical Effect
This determination requires a distinction between the satiric and the
merely comic. While this might seem a literary judgment, beyond the
ordinary operations of a court, the court in Showcase Atlanta had little
trouble in making this distinction. 148 The court pointed out several parts
of the infringing play which did have a satiric effect, places where
through the character in the play the playwright "critically commented
upon a character in the original."1 49 The court was also able to distin-
guish between parody and humor where an originally comic character
was being played for even more laughs. 150 Further, it was able to look at
the play as a whole and decide that the non-satiric outweighed the satiric,
so that the overall effect fell short of parody. 151
The court should look for an overall or predominant critical effect. 152
146. This is exemplified in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
147. This is the approach of the Second Circuit in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1980). The court's problem there
is insufficient analysis of parody's function.
148. 479F. Supp. at351.
149. For example, the "gentle" Melanie of the film became the "insipid" Melodie of the play.
Id. at 357-58.
150. Id. at 358.
151. Id.at357.
152. See Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 385 (D. Conn. 1972),
aff'd inpart, rev'dinpart, 520 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976) (non-parody:
nearly verbatim copy of Jesus Christ Superstar, with a few variations to make it "better" theology,
exceeds needs of criticism).
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The basic test should be one of reasonableness; 153 if a reasonably percep-
tive viewer would say that the work as a whole is critical commentary, the
basic rationale for fair use will be met.
Defendant should have the burden of articulating the critical point he
was attempting to make. 154 If the satiric effect is clear this will not be an
onerous burden. On the other hand, in close cases defendant's inability to
explain the critical aspects of a work may alert courts to attempts to use
the parody defense as a sham. In Air Pirates, defendants made a reasoned
argument which supported their claim that they intended criticism of the
bland and happy assumptions of Disney's "wonderful world." 55 In con-
trast, in Mature (the Happy Hooker case) the defendants' bare claim that
they were emphasizing a comic view of adolescence creates a suspicion
that criticism, if any, was an after-the-complaint idea. 156
B. Determining the Amount Necessary
Deciding whether the parodist took more than necessary for his effect
is a question of fact for the court. It may also require some literary judg-
ment, which can be aided by expert testimony. In many cases, an initial
determination that there is no strong overall critical effect solves the prob-
lem. When defendant has taken much extraneous material, the satiric ef-
fect will be necessarily diluted, as happened in Showcase Theatres.
There, defendant simply took too much of the purely comic and the seri-
ous, so that the use of parody was "inconsistent."1 57 Again, the burden
should be on the defendant to convince the court that his work would have
lost effectiveness if he had taken less.
Cases like Wilson (the Cunnilingus Champion) 58 which use parody of
the work to criticize society in general require further inquiry. Although
there need not be criticism of the work itself, defendants should be re-
quired to establish some connection between the alleged parody and the
153. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d. Cir.
1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) ("The fair use concept is based on the concept of reason-
ableness"). The court in Rosemont goes on to say that verbatim copying cannot meet the "'reason-
ableness" standard. This may not always be true. See part II.B.2. supra.
154. This is in accord with the suggestion that the burden of fair use should be on the defendant.
while the burden of proving infringement-hence, substantial similarity-should be on plaintiff.
Comment, supra note 15, at 106. This commentator also suggests that the amount of the taking be
considered only at the substantial similarity level.
155. Brief for Appellant at 28-31. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1138 (1979).
156. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
157. 479 F. Supp. at 357.
158. See notes 128-139 and accompanying text supra. The parodies in Berlin were similar cases
of parody as a vehicle. See note 139 supra.
Vol. 57:163, 1981
Parody and Fair Use
social criticism, or else the adaptation of the original has no reason to be
treated differently from any other derivative work. In Wilson, for exam-
ple, defendants would have to show that by making fun of the music of
the forties, they were furthering criticism of their claimed object, the sex-
ual taboos of today. Further, they would have to show that "Boogie
Woogie Bugle Boy" was a particularly appropriate vehicle to make this
criticism. This is a more difficult burden than in the direct parody cases.
But in cases where the parodied work is really just a vehicle of broader
social criticism, the defendant has a broad range of works from which to
choose his vehicle-some perhaps not copyrighted-and he should be
required to prove the necessity of his particular choice, just as he must
prove the necessity of the amount he took.
As a whole, the issue of whether the amount taken was necessary to the
effect should be no more difficult than the present task of deciding
whether defendant took more than he needed to conjure up the original.
Both of these determinations depend ultimately on the individual judg-
ment of the trier of fact. With the conjure up test, however, the court must
often decide how well the public is likely to know the original, a decision
which seems to be based on judicial notice. 159 The necessity-to-the-effect
test avoids the need for such judgments. More important, this test is con-
sistent with the idea that parody is an independent art which should not be
required to perform poorly to survive.
V. CONCLUSION
True parody is not usually a threat to the economic value of a copy-
right; it will rarely result in the substitution effect. When a parody victim
sues, one may wonder then what was really hurt: copyright or pride. Pro-
tecting pride, or even the "integrity" of a work, is not the aim of United
States copyright law. But the record of modem parody cases raises the
suspicion that the courts are basing their decisions more on sympathy for
the battered victim or on distaste for the unsavory form of some of the
parodies than on copyright principles. 160
159. See Showcase Atlanta, 479 F. Supp. at 359. See also Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757-58.
Kaplan notes that parody's "reprise of the original... may have to be extensive when the audience is
not very knowledgeable." B. KAPLAN, supra note 22, at 69. The conjure up test requires a decision
by the court on exactly how knowledgeable the audience is.
160. Light, sapra note 21, at 635. Some judges have recognized this:
In my view the defendants' use of "dirty lyrics" or of language and allusions that I might
personally find distasteful or even offensive is wholly irrelevant to the issue before us, which
is whether the defendants' use, obscene or not, is permissible under the fair use doctrine ....
We cannot, under the guise of deciding a copyright issue, act as a board of censors outlawing
X-rated performances. Obscenity or pornography play no part in this case. Moreover, permis-
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The critical effect test forces the court to apply a standard which has a
logical relationship to the fair use rationale. While not solving the prob-
lems of judicial prejudice against parodies in "bad taste," the critical
effect test at least will help bring the value judgments into the open, by
forcing courts to explain their reasons. In contrast, a court which can rest
on some quantitative threshold like the conjure up test can easily decide
that defendant took "too much" and never be forced to explain what
judgments about the value of defendant's work went into the decision.
Adoption of the critical effect test in parody cases will lead to fairer
results for both the author of the original and for the parodist. An author
will be protected from merely humorous use of his copyrighted material
which might otherwise pass the conjure up test. On the other hand, true
critical parody would not be prohibited simply because the original might
be recognizable with a smaller borrowing.
Fair use is an exception to the general right of copyright holders to
control their work. Defendants should be required to justify their claim to
this exception, and the claim should be related to the basic purposes of the
whole copyright scheme. As a form of criticism, parody promotes the
healthy growth of the arts and sciences; it deserves protection from claims
of infringement commensurate with its importance as a force for prog-
ress.
Susan Linehan Faaland
sible parody, whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success, just as a
public figure must tolerate more personal attack than the average private citizen.
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 588 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield. J.. dissenting).
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